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 THE TWO FACES OF EMERGENCE
 IN ECONOMICS
 Mark Kuperberg
 ^s this anthology makes clear, there is not one definition of
 emergence that is universally agreed upon, nor for progress to
 be made in the field does there need to be one. For the purposes
 of this essay, however, I will use a stripped down definition which
 if not common to all emergent processes, does at least summa-
 rize what is at the core of most examples. These core characteris-
 tics include:
 1) At least two levels of organization,
 2) A multitude of individual agents at the lower level of organiza-
 tion who operate by following simple rules, and
 3) An aggregate outcome at the higher level that results from the
 interaction of these individual agents, but which is not easily deriv-
 able from the rules that the individual agents follow. Many times,
 therefore, this aggregate outcome comes as a surprise to the ob-
 server because nothing in the rules at the lower level seem to pre-
 determine the aggregate outcome.
 If we take these three characteristics to be a canonical repre-
 sentation of emergence, then economics was the first discipline
 to have emergent processes at its core. In 1776, Adam Smith
 wrote in The Wealth of Nations:
 It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the
 baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their
 own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to
 their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of
 their advantages. (14)
 every individual . . . neither intends to promote the public interest,
 nor knows how much he is promoting it. ... he intends only his
 own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its
 produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own
 Mark Kuperberg is Professor of Economics at Swarthmore College.
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 gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible
 hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is
 it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursu-
 ing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society
 more effectually than when he really intends to promote it.1 (423)
 The above quotations are certainly the most famous in all of
 economics, and they remain the central dogma of the discipline
 to this day. What distinguishes an economist from other social
 scientists (and other people in general) is a faith that self-interest
 at the lower level, when channeled through competitive markets,
 will result in a beneficial outcome at the aggregate level. Modern
 economics has discovered many exceptions to this rule, but they
 remain the exception and Adam Smith's insight remains the
 rule. With the exception of evolutionary biology, there is no
 modern academic discipline that so thoroughly embraces the
 concept of emergence at its core.
 In this essay, I begin by providing the reader with the technical
 knowledge of economics that is necessary to follow the argu-
 ments, and I then introduce two explicit emergent models that
 reach conclusions which are at variance with the sunny vision of
 Adam Smith. Finally, I discuss Macroeconomics where emergent
 modeling has not proceeded very far but where it is very much
 needed.
 Economic Theory and Practice
 The Gold Standard in economics is economic efficiency (or
 Pareto efficiency) .* An allocation of resources is efficient if it is
 impossible to make any one person better off without making
 someone else worse off. At an efficient allocation, all waste has
 been squeezed out of the system in the sense that the only way to
 improve the well being of one person is by taking resources away
 from and thereby harming someone else. At an efficient alloca-
 tion, all possibilities for mutually improving the well being of in-
 dividuals have been exhausted. Economics is, in essence, the
 study of how to know when these conditions are met, when they
 are violated, and what to do when they are violated.
 Adam Smith never used the phrase "economic efficiency" and
 did not know the formal conditions under which it could be
 achieved. However, when economics was formalized in the nine-
 teenth century, it became clear that under suitable assumptions,
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 competitive markets of the kind that Adam Smith championed
 would achieve economic efficiency. This insight is so central to
 modern economics that it is known as the First Fundamental
 Theorem of Welfare Economics. It also became clear, although
 not formalized until the twentieth century, that many of the insti-
 tutions that Adam Smith condemned, such as monopolies, re-
 sulted in economic inefficiency. The corpus of knowledge
 developed after Adam Smith, which in so many ways confirmed
 his intuitions, is called Neoclassical or Walrasian economics.3
 A curious thing about Neoclassical economics is that the econ-
 omy is not modeled as an emergent process; in fact, quite the
 opposite. The Neoclassical tradition is so far removed from emer-
 gence that many of its central propositions can be derived from,
 and illustrated by, an economy with just one individual. That one
 individual is called "the representative agent" or with a little
 more literary flair, "Robinson Crusoe." Economists use a Robin-
 son Crusoe economy as a pedagogic tool to derive the conditions
 for economic efficiency. If you only have one person, economic
 efficiency is synonymous with Robinson behaving sensibly and
 not wasting any of his resources. The Robinson Crusoe economy
 enables economists to turn what is a hard problem of market
 analysis into what is, in essence, an engineering problem: how
 Robinson might best maximize his lifetime utility.
 Modern economists have become so accustomed to using
 Robinson Crusoe as an explanatory tool, that they may not real-
 ize how much of Adam Smith's original insight is lost. For Smith,
 what was surprising was that individuals motivated by self- interest
 could nevertheless promote the interest of society. In a Robinson
 Crusoe economy, there is no society, and it is completely unsur-
 prising that Robinson Crusoe promotes his own self-interest.
 While not all propositions in Neoclassical economics can be un-
 derstood by studying an economy with one individual, it is sur-
 prising how many can. Still, this surprise is diametrically opposed
 to Adam Smith's surprise. What made Smith's insight so remark-
 able was his awareness that there was a disconnect between the
 two levels of analysis: The rule at the level of the individual was
 self-interest, but what emerged at the societal level was what we
 now call economic efficiency. In the Robinson Crusoe correspon-
 dence, the rule at the level of the individual is optimization and
 the outcome at the societal level is what we now call a Pareto
This content downloaded from 130.58.65.13 on Wed, 04 Oct 2017 18:47:22 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 52 SOUNDINGS Mark Kuperberg
 efficient/ optimal allocation. There is nothing surprising about
 optimality flowing from the behavior of an individual to an entire
 economy when the economy contains only one individual.
 It should be emphasized that the First Fundamental Theorem
 of Welfare Economics is not a form of misplaced anthropomor-
 phism. The Welfare Theorem is a rigorously proven proposition
 that does not conceive of the economy as one large individual.
 The problem comes when economists start making statements
 about the real economy on the basis of a representative agent.
 The conditions under which the behavior of an entire economy
 can be predicted from the behavior of one individual are very
 severe. They basically amount to assuming that everyone in the
 economy is identical in terms of tastes and income. This, of
 course, is never true. Take the simplest possible example: As-
 sume that it is the case that when the fish are running, Robinson
 spends more time fishing because the price of fish in terms of
 foregone leisure has declined. Even if this is true for an individ-
 ual, we cannot conclude that for an entire economy, the demand
 for fish will go up as the price falls. What is true for the individual
 may not be true for the society as a whole. The First Fundamental
 Theorem of Welfare Economics does not guarantee this corre-
 spondence. What the Theorem guarantees is that if the economy
 is competitive and certain other assumptions hold, then when
 the price offish falls, whatever outcome emerges will be efficient.
 The Dark Side of Emergence
 So, the first face of emergence in economics which comes
 down to us from Adam Smith is a very positive one: The road to
 heaven may be paved with bad intentions. Agents acting selfishly
 can, nevertheless, create an aggregate outcome such that it is im-
 possible to make someone better off without making someone
 else worse off. This is an amazingly strong statement. As the
 Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow wrote in General Competitive Anal-
 ysis, a textbook that codified Neoclassical economics for a gener-
 ation of economists:
 the notion that a social system moved by independent actions in
 pursuit of different values is consistent with a final coherent state
 of balance, and one in which the outcomes may be quite different
 from those intended by the agents, is surely the most important
 intellectual contribution that economic thought has made to the
 general understanding of social processes.4 (1)
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 The Schelling Segregation Model
 The first economist, to my knowledge, to create an emergent
 model whose outcomes were not socially desirable was Thomas
 Schelling in Micromotives and Macrobehavior (1978). Schelling ana-
 lyzed how neighborhoods would emerge given that people had
 some preference to live near people like themselves.
 Figure 1 below illustrates a "society" where people (the grey
 and black dots) are distributed randomly throughout the space.5
 Figure 1
 Each individual has 8 neighbors, and we assume that they will
 move unless 3/8th (37.5%) of their neighbors are of the same
 color as themselves. This is not a strong preference for segrega-
 tion, and as a result, in Figure 1, 72.1% of the people are happy
 - meaning that they have at least three neighbors of their same
 color. Nevertheless, when you move people around until no one
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 is unhappy, Figure 2 emerges which has a substantial degree of
 segregation.
 Figure 2
 In Figure 1, approximately 50% of one's neighbors shared the
 same color, but in Figure 2 the number is over 80%. The surprise
 is that a relatively mild preference for living with people of the
 same color results in a substantial degree of segregation. So the
 rule at the lower level, "move if less than 3/8ths of your neigh-
 bors are of the same color," results in an aggregate outcome
 where more than 80% are of the same color.
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 Antz
 The Schelling Model does not relate directly to economics.
 While the outcome is bad given a social preference for integra-
 tion, one cannot say that the outcome is inefficient. In fact, since
 in the final equilibrium everyone is satisfied with their neighbor-
 hood, one could say the outcome is efficient. Of more relevance
 to economics is the model in Figure 36 which is derived from a
 paper by Kirman.7 Ostensibly, it is a model of ants who have a
 nest in the middle of the graph and forage for food from two
 equidistant food sources (red and blue) at the edges of the
 graph.
 There are three kinds of ants: ants that have no source affilia-
 tion, blue ants who forage at the blue source, and red ants who
 forage at the red source. Initially all ants have no affiliation, but
 when they discover one of the sources, they become that kind of
 ant and bring food back to the nest and then go out again to that
 source. If a blue ant encounters an unaffiliated ant (one that has
 not yet discovered a source), then that ant is recruited to become a
 blue ant (similarly for red ants). The final effect that makes the
 model interesting is that an affiliated ant that is not carrying food
 can be converted to the other color with some probability if it en-
 counters an ant of the other color.
 This model can be applied to a range of economic situations
 such as those in which people are choosing to adopt one of two
 alternative technologies, choosing to do business with one of two
 alternative firms, and so forth. The model then neatly illustrates
 two opposing views of how competition in such situations will
 evolve:
 1) Since the food sources are equidistant from the nest, equally
 plentiful, and the ants initially move randomly, one might think
 that 50% of the ants will be red and 50% will be blue. In the con-
 text of this model, this would be the "competitive" outcome, and it
 is what would be predicted by what economists call the Hotelling
 model.8
 2) Since ants can recruit and convert other ants that they meet,
 one might think that if one source develops a lead in ant affilia-
 tion, it will build on that lead and ultimately all the ants will be of
 that color. This is sometimes called the "first stake in the ground"
 theory.
 Which of these two outcomes emerges is not only of academic
 interest. One of the major driving forces behind the stock market
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 Figure 3
 bubble of the late 1990' s was the belief that if a firm developed a
 lead in internet customers, it would lock in that customer base
 and have very high profits in the future even if it was currently
 suffering severe loses. What the model shows is that, as expected,
 if there is no recruitment or conversion of ants, the Hotelling
 result emerges: Approximately 50% of the ants are red and 50%
 are blue. Surprisingly, this result is essentially unchanged if there
 is recruitment but no conversion. With recruitment and no con-
 version, the ability of ants affiliated with a given source to recruit
 other ants does not tip the scales irreversibly to the first source
 found. The fact that ants are randomly searching for a source at
 the beginning insures a nearly equal split between sources. In
 either case, without the possibility of conversion, the model is in
 equilibrium when all ants are affiliated with some source; recruit-
 ment simply speeds this process up.
 Figure 4 illustrates the case of recruitment and conversion at a
 rate of 75% and plots the proportion of red ants. As can be seen,
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 even after more than 14,000 periods the model does not settle
 into an equilibrium; the percentage of red ants fluctuates widely.
 Why is this? The reason is the complex interplay between positive
 and negative feedback that is at work in the model. Positive feed-
 back results from the fact that when there are more ants of a
 particular color, it is more likely that an unaffiliated ant will meet
 an ant of that color and be recruited and from the fact that there
 are more "missionary" ants of that color to convert ants of the
 opposing color. If these were the only mechanisms in operation,
 eventually all ants would be of one color. Negative feedback re-
 sults from the fact that when there are more ants of a particular
 color, there are necessarily more ants who are not carrying food
 of that color. For ants of the other color, therefore, there are
 many potential converts. For the ants of the minority color, the
 graph is a target rich environment. If the conversion rate is set
 high enough, these two forces are continually at war with one
 another and neither of the two intuitions discussed above is
 correct.
 Figure 4
 Figure 4 illustrates the danger in telling top-level stories or
 finding patterns in top-level phenomena when the underlying
 process is emergent. Looking at the time series in Figure 4,
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 macroeconomists might analyze the tops and bottoms of the per-
 cent red ants as peaks and troughs of business cycles and seek
 macroeconomic explanations for their occurrence. Technical
 stock market analysts might look at the pattern of percent red
 ants and claim to be able to predict future movements.9 But we
 know from how the model was constructed that telling aggregate
 stories about movements during particular time periods is non-
 sense because all of the observed phenomena were caused by in-
 teractions at the local level.
 A New Kind of Economics
 Just as there are multiple definitions of emergence, there are
 multiple descriptions of how an economics based on emergent
 principles differs from traditional neoclassical/Walrasian eco-
 nomics. As I did with my definition of canonical emergence, I
 will state the minimum set of characteristics that distinguish what
 has come to be known as "agent based computational econom-
 ics" from traditional economics.
 A fortiori, agent based computational economics is populated
 by heterogeneous agents. I say a fortiori because it is in the very
 nature of Emergence that agents interacting at a local level can-
 not be identical. So, for example, in the segregation model,
 agents differ by their initial position in the grid and therefore by
 who their immediate neighbors are. Even if agents were initially
 programmed to be identical, their local interaction with one an-
 other would be different and they would soon cease to be identi-
 cal. This necessary lack of a representative agent means that one
 cannot in emergence adopt the Robinson Crusoe methodology
 where economic efficiency flows to the whole economy from the
 maximizing behavior of one individual. Still, heterogeneity in no
 way negates the First Theorem of Welfare Economics. A strength
 of the First Theorem and of Walrasian economics is that both are
 perfectly capable of dealing with any degree of heterogeneity. So,
 while some economists see heterogeneity as a hallmark of agent
 based computational economics, its real role is to eliminate the
 possibility of using the intellectually suspect Robinson Crusoe
 methodology.
 What fundamentally differentiates agent based computational
 economics from traditional Walrasian economics is that eco-
 nomic activity occurs outside of equilibrium. Equilibrium is a
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 state of rest for any system: It is the "state of balance" referred to
 in the quotation from Kenneth Arrow. Agent based models can
 certainly have an equilibrium. In the segregation model, for ex-
 ample, equilibrium occurs when everyone is content with the
 color distribution of their neighbors. This equilibrium is not
 unique, however, if by unique we mean that any initial pattern of
 dots will produce an identical final pattern of dots; rather, the
 outcome depends critically on the initial placement of the dots
 and also on the order in which people get to move. It is generally
 the case that once out of equilibrium trades or economic activity
 are allowed, the ultimate equilibrium, if there is one, will not be
 unique.
 While the existence of an equilibrium is important for the
 analysis in this essay, uniqueness of the equilibrium is not a cen-
 tral concern. The essential question is whether the equilibrium
 will be efficient. Under standard assumptions, what assures effi-
 ciency in traditional Walrasian economics is a fictitious character
 called the Walrasian auctioneer who aggregates all supply and
 demand information and allows trading only at market clearing
 prices. In other words, equilibrium prices are first established by
 the auctioneer and then trading takes place. It is never the case
 that someone wants to supply or demand something at current
 prices and cannot find a willing buyer or seller. The Walrasian
 auctioneer is the economics version of a top-down coordinator,
 and it is a hallmark of emergent processes that there is no such
 coordinator. Without the auctioneer, one must generate the final
 equilibrium from the local interaction of the individual agents.
 Under what circumstances such an equilibrium will be efficient is
 an open question.
 Macroeconomics
 Macroeconomics is the study of the economic activity of the
 economy taken as a whole. To carry out this study, macroeco-
 nomists create economywide aggregates of individual real world
 variables. Some of these aggregates are sums of individual vari-
 ables such as gross domestic product, w7hich is the sum total of
 the economy's production of goods and services for a given time
 period; other aggregates are averages of individual variables such
 as the price level or the inflation rate, which average individual
 prices and their percentage changes. The goal of macroeconom-
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 ics is to understand the movements of and the relationships be-
 tween these various aggregates. If we conceive of the economy as
 an emergent system, then from this description, it should be ob-
 vious that macroeconomics is inherently the study of its top-level
 behavior.
 Modern macroeconomics began with the publication in 1936
 of The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money by John
 Maynard Keynes. Virtually since its inception, there has been a
 research agenda to provide microfoundations for the relation-
 ships between the macroeconomic aggregates. For the most part,
 this research program has used traditional neoclassical/Walra-
 sian economics to provide the microfoundations. Such an ap-
 proach contained within itself an internal contradiction which
 only became fully obvious in the 1970's with the advent of what is
 known as New Classical Economics. We have seen that traditional
 Walrasian economics shares with Adam Smith an optimistic view
 of the workings of the economy. The central message of The Gen-
 eral Theory, however, was that the performance of the economy
 would many times be sub-optimal. Because the central tenden-
 cies of Walrasian and Keynesian economics are diametrically op-
 posed, the effort to provide microfoundations for Keynesian
 macroeconomics has yet to produce a model that is convincing
 to most economists.
 What I wish to argue here is that the reason for this failure may
 be that we are using the wrong microeconomic paradigm. In-
 stead of using traditional neoclassical/Walrasian analysis, per-
 haps we should be thinking in terms of emergent processes. This
 has implications for both economic efficiency and economic pre-
 dictions. With respect to predictions, we can see that the ants
 model exhibits internally generated behavior that is apparently
 cyclical. I say "apparently" because there unquestionably is not a
 mechanism generating a fixed periodicity to these cycles. The
 cyclical behavior emerges from the local interaction of the ants.
 This is in stark contrast with the standard macroeconomic expla-
 nation for apparent cyclical behavior that is found in both Keyne-
 sian and New Classical macroeconomics. According to the
 standard view, apparent cyclical behavior is generated when the
 economy is hit by an aggregate exogenous disturbance, a natural
 disaster, say, or a political conflict. The internal mechanisms of
 the economy then augment and ultimately dampen down this
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 disturbance, and the only reason that there appears to be busi-
 ness cycles is that the economy is hit later on by another
 disturbance.10
 A key premise behind the standard view is that macroeco-
 nomic events must have macroeconomic causes: Changes in the
 macroeconomic aggregates must be the result of macroeconomic
 disturbances. This is precisely what an emergent perspective calls
 into question. What the standard view calls a macroeconomic dis-
 turbance can be, as in the ants model, the bubbling up to the
 macroeconomic surface of small events at the local level. Some
 events at the local level are nullified at the local level: So, for
 example, an ant not carrying food converts to the opposing
 color, but then meets an ant of its original color and converts
 back. We never see these events at the top-level and are com-
 pletely unaware of their existence. But sometimes, a local interac-
 tion, or the random occurrence of many local interactions of the
 same type, is propagated by positive feedback into a bigger and
 bigger event until it emerges at the top-level as a macroeconomic
 event.
 In the give and take between micro and macroeconomists, a
 standard line by microeconomists is, "there is no such thing as
 macroeconomics," by which they mean that all that really exists is
 individual behavior and its aggregation into markets. Emergent
 processes, of course, have precisely this quality. The case can be
 made that all of what is observed at the top-level is epiphenome-
 nal and that the only reality is the local interactions. I would ar-
 gue, however, that this does not imply that one has to give up on
 aggregate relationships or on the possibility of finding higher
 level laws. The paradigm should be Boyle's Law where an aggre-
 gate equation describes the top-level behavior of a gas with no
 reference to the interactions of the individual gas molecules. The
 aggregate relationship must, of course, be consistent with what is
 happening at the micro level, but in an emergent system there is
 no presumption that the aggregate outcome will have a simple
 correspondence to the micro rules.
 With respect to economic efficiency, while both Keynesian and
 New Classical economics share a common view that macroeco-
 nomic outcomes have macroeconomic causes, they come to dia-
 metrically opposite efficiency conclusions. New Classical
 economics follows the Walrasian tradition and relies very heavily,
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 almost exclusively, on representative agent modeling. It is not
 surprising, therefore, that it comes to the conclusion that the
 economy is operating efficiently. The hope that emergence holds
 out for Keynesian economics is that by banishing the representa-
 tive agent, it also eliminates the all too easy correspondence be-
 tween optimality at the individual level and efficiency at the top
 level. This opens up the rich possibility that individuals behaving
 optimally will interact with one another in such a way that the
 top-level outcome will not be efficient.11 But whether such an
 approach will bear fruit remains to be seen.
 NOTES
 1. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1776, New York: Modern Library, 2004.
 As an eighteenth-century man, Adam Smith was referring to Providence, or
 God, when he used the phrase "invisible hand." So Smith's views cannot be
 considered fully modern because emergence, as now understood, does not
 consider the phenomena that emerge at the higher level to be designed by
 anyone. But, when modern economists refer to the "invisible hand," they
 mean the impersonal forces of supply and demand which is consistent with
 the meaning of emergence.
 2. Named after the economist Vilfredo Pareto who first systematized the con-
 ditions that are satisfied by an efficient allocation of resources in Manual of
 Political Economy, 1906, trans. Ann S. Schwier, New York: A. M. Kelly, 1971.
 3. Named after Leon Walras who first formalized the economy as a general
 equilibrium system in Elements of Pure Economics, Homewood, IL: American
 Economic Association, 1874, trans. William Jaffe 1954.
 4. Kenneth Arrow, General Competitive Analysis, San Fransisco: Holden-Day,
 1971
 5. NetLogo model created by Uri Wilensky 1998.
 6. NetLogo model created by author.
 7. Alan Kirman, "Ants, Rationality, and Recruitment," Quarterly Journal of Eco-
 nomics 108.1 (February 1993):137-57.
 8. Named after Harold Hotelling, who in "Stability in Competition," Economic
 Journal 39.153 (March 1929): 41-7, first developed an equilibrium model of
 spacial competition.
 9. There is a lot of confusion in the emergence literature as to whether emer-
 gent phenomena are necessarily random and/or unpredictable. The Ant
 model has a random element in the conversion rate, but that is not central
 to the result. Where technical analysts go wrong is in assuming that one can
 predict the movements in the graph based on past movements in the
 graph. In order to predict the movements of the percent red ants, one
 needs to know where every ant is and how it is interacting with every other
 ant.
 10. There is a large literature dealing with endogenous business cycles, but this
 is not the majority view among macroeconomists.
 11. It is important not to claim too much for emergent modeling and too little
 for the traditional Walrasian approach. Traditional economics has analyzed
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 a full set of conditions under which markets do not result in efficiency. The
 most empirically important are: 1) externalities which result in excessive
 pollution and 2) information asymmetries which result in malfunctions of
 insurance and financial markets. Likewise, it is not the case that all emer-
 gent models will result in inefficiency, sometimes the emergent outcome
 may mirror the Walrasian outcome. The point made in the text is that the
 central tendency of these modeling strategies is different.
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